Theism, The Hypothesis of Indifference, and the Biological Role of Pain and Pleasure by Howard-Snyder, Daniel
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 11 Issue 3 Article 6 
7-1-1994 
Theism, The Hypothesis of Indifference, and the Biological Role of 
Pain and Pleasure 
Daniel Howard-Snyder 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Howard-Snyder, Daniel (1994) "Theism, The Hypothesis of Indifference, and the Biological Role of Pain 
and Pleasure," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 11 : Iss. 3 , 
Article 6. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol11/iss3/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
THEISM, THE HYPOTHESIS OF INDIFFERENCE, 
AND THE BIOLOGICAL ROLE 
OF PAIN AND PLEASURE 
Daniel Howard-Snyder 
Following Hume's lead, Paul Draper argues that. given the biological role 
played by both pain and pleasure in goal-directed organic systems, the ob-
served facts about pain and pleasure in the world are antecedently much 
more likely on the Hypothesis of Indifference than on theism. I examine one 
by one Draper's arguments for this claim and show how they miss the mark. 
1. Hurne's Indifference Hypothesis 
In Part IX of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume has Philo 
reflect on the "immense profusion of beings" on earth. their "prodigious 
variety and fecundity" and their destructiveness and inability to achieve hap-
piness. What hypothesis could possibly explain such mixed phenomena? 
Here the Manichean system occurs as a proper hypothesis to solve the diffi-
culty; and, no doubt, in some respects it is very specious and has more 
probability than the common hypothesis, by giving a plausible account of the 
strange mixture of good and ill which appears in life. But if we consider. on 
the other hand, the perfect uniformity and agreement of the parts of the 
universe, we shall not discover in it any marks of the combat of a malevolent 
with a benevolent being. There is indeed an opposition of pains and pleasures 
in the feelings of sensible creatures; but are not all the operations of nature 
carried on by an opposition of principles, of hot and cold, moist and dry, light 
and heavy? The true conclusion is that the original source of all things is entirely 
indifferent to all these principles, and has no more regard to good above ill than 
to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light above heavy. 
There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the 
universe: that they are endowed with perfect goodness; that they have perfect 
malice; that they are opposite and have both goodness and malice; that they 
have neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena can never prove the 
two former unmixed principles; and the uniformity and steadiness of general 
laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems by far the most 
probable. (Hume 1970, pp. 103-104) 
Hume initially contrasts Manicheanism with "the common hypothesis," the-
ism. The former, he says. explains the pattern of suffering and good in the 
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world better than the latter; hence Manicheanism is more probable than the-
ism on that account. However, theism explains the orderliness of nature better 
than Manicheanism, and so theism is more probable than Manicheanism in 
light of that fact. Interestingly, Hume does not pursue the relative merits of 
these competing hypotheses. Instead, he introduces a third: "the original 
source of all things is entirely indifferent to all these principles, and has no 
more regard to good above ill than to heat above cold ... " Call this the Indif-
ference Hypothesis (lH). Hume asserts that, unlike Manicheanism, IH better 
explains the orderliness of the world and, unlike theism and the malicious 
genius hypothesis, IH better explains the "mixed phenomena" of good and 
evil. Thus, IH is more probable than any of its competitors, including theism. 
Four features of Hume's strategy are worth noting. 
i. He is concerned to show that observed facts about both good and evil 
are more likely on IH than on theism. Thus, he aims to shortcircuit the 
response that even if evil is more likely on nontheistic hypotheses, the good 
in the world is much more likely on theism. 
ii. The central claim - that facts about good and ill in the world are more 
likely on IH than on theism - can be true even if we are unsure exactly how 
likely those facts are on theism. All Hume needs is the judgment that facts 
about good and evil are comparatively more likely on IH than on theism. 
iii. Hume's strategy would work even if IH is neither true, nor probable 
nor more reasonable than not to believe. IH need only be more likely than 
theism in order to infer that theism is improbable. If two hypotheses are 
incompatible and known to be so, and the first is more probable than the 
second. then the probability of the second is lower than .5 regardless of how 
probable or improbable the first is. 
iv. Hume says that there is some "operation of nature" that is "carried on" 
by "the opposition of pains and pleasures in the feelings of sensible crea-
tures." This natural role played by pain and pleasure, he says, is not unusual, 
since "all the operations of nature [are] carried on by an opposition of prin-
ciples." Moreover, this natural role is what makes the observed facts about 
good and ill, pain and pleasure, more likely on IH than on theism. Although 
it is clear enough that Hume thinks the observed facts about pain and pleasure 
are due to some role pain and pleasure play in the lives of sentient beings 
and that this role makes those facts more likely on IH than on theism, it is 
not clear in the passage quoted what role he is talking about. However, he 
suggests earlier in Part IX that it is the role of pain and pleasure in "the great 
work of self-preservation" that he has in mind (Hume ]970, pp. 96-97). So 
the idea is that observed facts about pain and pleasure are more likely on IH 
than on theism because of the role that pain and pleasure play in keeping 
sentient beings alive, in short, because of their survival value. While this 
suggestion is certainly interesting, one would like Hume to have had Philo 
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say more about why the role that pain and pleasure play in self-preservation 
renders the observed facts about pain and pleasure more likely on IH than on 
theism. l 
2. Draper ~ Deployment of Hume ~ Strategy 
Fortunately for students of Hume and the problem of evil, Paul Draper has 
recently given us a good idea how the gap in Hume's strategy might be filled 
(Draper 1989, 1993, 1995). Draper asks us to consider a serious alternative 
hypothesis to theism, by which he means one that is incompatible with theism, 
not ad hoc and at least as initially plausible as theism. He calls it the Hy-
pothesis of Indifference (HI): 
Neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result 
of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by non-human persons. 
Now, let '0' stand for a statement reporting all the observed facts about pain 
and pleasure in the world. And let a theistic story be any attempt to explain 
certain facts about evil or good in terms of theism. Draper claims that 
(C) 0 is antecedently much more probable on the assumption that HI is true 
than on the assumption that theism is true. 
That is, given what we know apart from 0, the probability of 0 on HI is 
much greater than the probability of 0 on theism.2 Let's abbreviate this as 
the claim that P(O/HI) >! P(O/theism), where ">!" stands for ." . .is much 
greater than .... " The main premises for Draper's argument for C are these: 
(1) Given "the biological role played by both pain and pleasure in goal-di-
rected organic systems," independent of the effect of theistic stories on 
P(O/theism), C is true. 
(2) Theistic stories do not significantly raise P(O/theism). 
Peter van Inwagen has argued (van Inwagen 1991) that Draper's argument is 
marred by the fact that some theistic stories show that we are unable to 
compare the antecedent probability of O/theism to the antecedent probability 
of O/HI; hence, we are hardly in a position to judge that P(OIHI) >! P(O/the-
ism). Van Inwagen might well be onto something here. But whether he is or 
not is not my concern in this paper. (But see Draper 1995 and van Inwagen 
1995.) My view is that there is something even more fundamentally defective 
about Draper's argument, namely, that none of the considerations he adduces 
in support of (1) lend it any credibility at all. I shall defend this charge in 
short order; but first, I want to observe three things useful for understanding 
Draper's case properly. 
3. Three Preliminary Observations 
i. Draper claims that P(O/HI) >! P(O/theism). The probabilities in question 
here are conditional epistemic probabilities, not logical, statistical or other 
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probabilities. "The concept of epistemic probability," Draper notes, "is an 
ordinary concept of probability for which no adequate philosophical analysis 
has ... been proposed." But, for the purposes of preceding with the argument, 
Draper offers this: where K is an epistemic situation and p and q are propo-
sitions, relative to K, p is epistemically more probable than q just in case any 
fully rational person in K would have a higher degree of belief that p than 
that q (Draper 1989, p. 349). Three comments are in order. First, let an 
"epistemic situation" for an individual at a time be just what she has to go 
on at the time to judge whether p or q is true. Second, since what one has to 
go on may differ from what another has to go on, and since what one has to go on 
at one time may differ from what one has to go on at another time, the epistemic 
probability of a proposition may differ from person to person and change 
over time for an individual. This opens the door to the possibility that while 
Draper's arguments might well show that relative to some epistemic situ-
ations, P(O/HI) >! P(O/theism), relative to others, P(OIHI) <! P(O/theism). 
(See Plantinga 1988, 1995 and Draper 1991 on this point.) Indeed, relative 
to some epistemic situations it might be that P(O/HI) = P(O/theism). Third, 
a fully rational person might consider the matter carefully and find herself in 
genuine doubt about how to make a very interesting comparative probability 
assignment: P(OIHI) ? P(O/theism). Barring any other considerations, the 
reasonable thing to do in that case would be to withhold belief about the 
matter. 
ii. In Draper's argument, "pain" refers to any sort of physical or emotional 
suffering, e.g., the pain of broken limb or childbirth, and grief over the loss 
of one's father. "Pleasure" refers not only to the "lower" pleasures - e.g., 
the pleasure a dip in a cool stream brings in an Indiana summer - but the 
"higher" pleasures as well - e.g., the pleasure of good friends, Mozart, and 
constructing philosophical treatises. Now, much pain and pleasure is biologi-
cally useful - it causally contributes to the biological goals of an organism 
and its doing so is not biologically accidental. On the other hand, a lot of 
pain and pleasure is not biologically useful - it is biologically gratuitous. 
However, according to Draper, nearly all known biologically gratuitous pain 
and pleasure is either pathological - it results from the failure of some 
organic system to function properly, e.g. the pain caused by terminal cancer-
or biologically appropriate - it is of a kind that is biologically useful but 
because of particular circumstances it doesn't contribute to the biological 
goals of organisms, e.g. the pain caused humans when they burn to death. 
Thus, pain and pleasure are explained biologically: they are either biologi-
cally useful, biologically appropriate, or pathological. 
iii. 0 is equivalent to the conjunction of three propositions - 01,02, and 
03 - reporting the facts about (1) moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure 
that is biologically useful, (2) non-moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure 
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that is biologically useful, and (3) sentient beings experiencing pain or pleas-
ure that is biologically gratuitous. To show that P(O/HI) >! P(O/theism), 
Draper argues for three propositions: P(Ol/HI) >! P(Ol/theism), P(02/HI & 
01) > P(02/theism & 01), and P(03/HI & 01 & 02) >! P(03/theism & 01 
& 02). If he succeeds, he will have shown that P(O/HI) >! P(O/theism). Now 
to Draper's arguments. 
4. The Argument for P(Ol/HI) >1 P(Ol/theism) 
a 1 is the proposition that records all the facts about moral agents experiencing 
biologically useful pain and pleasure. Now, why suppose that P(OI/HI) >! 
P(Ol/theism)? Because, says Draper, pain and pleasure differ significantly 
from other parts of organic systems - pain is intrinsically bad and pleasure 
is intrinsically good. But how does this difference give us reason to suppose 
that P(Ol/HI) >! P(Ol/theism)? Draper answers: 
HI entails that, if pain and pleasure exist, then they are not the result of 
malevolent or benevolent actions performed by nonhuman persons. So on HI, 
the moral difference between pain and pleasure and other parts of organic 
systems gives us no antecedent reason to believe that pain and pleasure will 
not play the same biological role that other parts of organic systems play. 
Indeed, a biological explanation of pain and pleasure is just the sort of 
explanation that one would expect on HI. But theism entails that God is 
responsible for the existence of any pain and pleasure in the world. Since 
God is morally perfect, He would have good moral reasons for producing 
pleasure even if it is never biologically useful, and He would not permit pain 
unless He had, not just a biological reason, but also a morally sufficient 
reason to do so. And since God is omnipotent and omniscient, He could create 
goal-directed organic systems (including humans) without biologically useful 
pain and pleasure. So theism entails both that God does not need biologically 
useful pain and pleasure to produce human goal-directed systems and that, 
if human pain and pleasure exist, then God had good moral reasons for 
producing them, reasons that for all we know antecedently, might very well 
be inconsistent with pain and pleasure systematically contributing to the 
biological goals of human organisms. Therefore, we would have much less 
reason on theism than on HI to be surprised if it turned out that human pain 
and pleasure differed from other parts of organic systems by not systemati-
cally contributing to the biological goals of those systems. Hence, since 01 
reports that the pain and pleasure experienced by humans (who are moral 
agents) do contribute in this way, P(OIIHI) is much greater than P(OI/the-
ism). (Draper 1989, pp. 336-37) 
As Draper correctly suggests in the second sentence, the fact that pain and 
pleasure have biological utility is manifestly not what one would expect on 
HI all by itself. So if we rightly expect biologically useful pain and pleasure 
on HI more than on theism it must be either because (a) we antecedently 
know something that gives us good reason to expect biologically useful pain 
and pleasure on HI, but we have no comparable reason to expect it on theism 
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or (b) we antecedently know something that gives us good reason not to 
expect biologically useful pain and pleasure on theism, but we have no com-
parable reason not to expect it on HI. Now, Draper suggests that, barring any 
reason not to expect biologically useful pain and pleasure on HI, the fact that 
other parts of organic systems possess biological utility should lead us to 
expect on HI that pain and pleasure will also be biologically useful. But, of 
course, if he's right, then the same holds true for theism. Barring reason not 
to expect biologically useful pain and pleasure on theism, the fact that other 
parts of organic systems have biological utility gives us reason to expect on 
theism that pain and pleasure will likewise be biologically useful. So, 
Draper's argument for P(OI/HI) >! P(Ol/theism) hangs on the claim that we 
antecedently know something that gives us reason not to expect biologically 
useful pain and pleasure on theism, but nothing we antecedently know gives 
us reason not to expect it on HI. 
What is that something? Jointly, that there is a deep moral difference be-
tween pain and pleasure, on the one hand, and other aspects of organic 
systems, on the other; that theism entails God has a morally justifying reasons 
to permit pain and pleasure;3 and, that since God is omnipotent and omnis-
cient, He could create human moral agents that do not experience biologically 
useful pain and pleasure. The argument proceeds: for all we know, God's 
reasons for permitting pain and pleasure might be inconsistent with their 
biological usefulness. Thus, on theism, we have reason to expect that, if pain 
and pleasure exist, they won't be biologically useful. But on HI we have no 
comparable reason to expect that, if pain and pleasure exist, they won't be 
biologically useful. Therefore, P(OI/HI) >! P(Ol/theism). 
I have two complaints about this argument, one major and one minor. But 
first, I want to remove a red herring. It is not at all clear that Draper has 
successfully located a moral difference between pain and pleasure, and other 
parts of organic systems. He suggests that pain and pleasure have intrinsic 
moral value or disvalue and other aspects of organic systems do not. But this 
assumes a highly controversial hedonic value theory. It is much more plau-
sible that there are other intrinsically valuable features of organic systems, 
life itself, for example, health, strength, beauty, overall flourishing of indi-
vidual organisms, and the mutual dependence of different organisms in a 
variety of ways. Of course, if there is no deep moral difference between pain 
and pleasure and other aspects of organic systems, then we can't say that 
since there is such a difference, the biological utility of pain and pleasure is 
less likely on theism than on HI.4 
But, contrary to what he suggests, Draper's argument does not need the 
premise that there is a deep moral difference between pain and pleasure and 
other aspects of organisms. What is crucial is the proposition that, for all we 
know, theism is incompatible with the biological utility of pain and pleasure. 
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He infers this not from the alleged difference between pain and pleasure and 
other aspects of organisms but from the fact that theism entails that there is 
a morally sufficient reason for God's permitting pain and pleasure and the 
premise that for all we know God's reasons are incompatible with the bio-
logical utility of pain and pleasure. Draper can have that argument without 
implying a highly controversial claim about what is and what is not intrinsi-
cally good and bad. So, let us not be distracted by Draper's claim that there 
is a deep moral disparity between pain and pleasure and other parts of organic 
systems. (Of course, if, contrary to what I have just said, Draper's argument 
relies on a hedonic value theory, then that is a major strike against it.) Now 
to my complaints. 
The minor worry is this: Suppose that, for all we know, God's reasons for 
permitting pain and pleasure are inconsistent with their biological usefulness. 
And suppose that this gives us some reason to expect that, on theism, pain 
and pleasure won't be biologically useful. Nevertheless, the fact that there is 
no comparable entailment on HI seems hardly enough reason to infer that we 
should assign a much higher degree of belief in 01 given HI than 01 given 
theism. At most, this justifies only a slightly higher degree of belief in 01 on 
HI than on theism. In that case, it becomes a serious question whether the 
slightly higher probability of 01 on HI than on theism is high enough to 
justify atheistic belief rather than agnosticism. To illustrate the general point 
here, suppose you have 100 students, 51 female and 49 male. You know that 
one of them, Pat, is coming for office hours today. While this information 
might well justify a two-bit bet on the proposition that Pat is a woman, it 
certainly is not sufficient to justify your telling anyone that a woman is 
coming for your office hours. The reason Draper gives for P(O l/HI) >! P 
(Ol/theism) seems about as weighty as your reason to think Pat is a woman. 
My major complaint, however, lies elsewhere. Draper asserts that for all 
we know God's reasons for permitting pain and pleasure are incompatible 
with their biological utility in order to suggest that, for all we know, theism 
itself is incompatible with the biological utility of pain and pleasure. Now, 
Draper is wrong to think that we don't know anything that implies that theism 
is compatible with the biological utility of pain and pleasure. We can think 
of reasons for God to permit pain and pleasure that are compatible with their 
biological utility. Here's one: pleasure is intrinsically good. Surely God might 
permit pleasure for that very reason, one that is obviously compatible with 
the biological utility of pleasure. Moreover, theistic stories of the sort 
sketched by contemporary theodicists certainly include reasons for permitting 
some pain, even horrific pain, and those reasons are obviously compatible 
with the biological utility of pain. It seems then that it is false that for all we 
know theism is incompatible with the biological utility of pain and pleasure. 
Of course, Draper will remind me that I am in the process of arguing that 
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his premise (1) is false, i.e. that it is false that given the biological role played 
by both pain and pleasure, independent of the effect of theistic stories on 
P(Olltheism), 01 is antecedently much more probable on HI than on theism; 
but I have introduced theistic stories to infer that we know some things that 
imply that theism and biologically useful pain and pleasure are compatible. 
Guilty as charged: I have introduced theistic stories. But what else could 
a reasonable person do? The only way to tell whether for all we know theism 
is incompatible with the biological utility of pleasure and pain is to consider 
whether we know of any consistent stories in which they both appear. And 
here's the rub: the same goes for HI and the biological utility of pain and 
pleasure. Draper says that on HI we have no comparable reason to expect 
that, if pain and pleasure exist, they won't be biologically useful. But we are 
entitled to join him in that judgment only if HI and the biological utility of 
pain and pleasure are compatible. And why should we think that? Because 
we can tell consistent stories in which both appear. But, surely, if we are 
allowed to consider HI-istic stories to assess whether we know something 
that implies that HI and biologically useful pain and pleasure are compatible, 
then we ought to be permitted to consider theistic stories for the same pur-
pose. Otherwise, we stand the chance of judging unfairly, or what's worse, 
inaccurately, that P(Ol/HI) >! P(Ol/theism). 
The point I'm making can be put in the form of a dilemma: either we may 
consider theistic stories to assess the claim that, for all we know, theism and 
biologically useful pain and pleasure are incompatible, or we may not; if we 
may, then, contra Draper, we do know some things - namely, theistic stories 
- that imply that theism and biologically useful pain and pleasure are com-
patible; if we may not, then, contra Draper, we cannot fairly claim that on 
HI we have no comparable reason to expect that, if pain and pleasure exist, 
they won't be biologically useful (since, aside from HI-istic stories, for all 
we know, HI and biologically useful pain and pleasure are not compatible). 
5. The Argument for P(02IHI & 01) > P(02ltheism & 01) 
What about the claim that P(02/HI & 01) > P(02/theism & 01)? 02 ex-
presses all the facts about nonmoral agents experiencing biologically useful 
pain and pleasure. If we rightly expect 02 on HI & 01 more than on theism 
& 01 it must be either because (a) we antecedently know something that 
gives us good enough reason to expect nonmoral agents to experience bio-
logically useful pain and pleasure on HI & 01, but we have no comparable 
reason to expect it on theism & 01 or (b) we antecedently know something 
that gives us reason not to expect nonmoral agents to experience biologically 
useful pain and pleasure on theism & 01, but we have no comparable reason 
not to expect it on HI & Ol. Now, Draper suggests that, barring any reason 
not to expect nonmoral agents to experience biologically useful pain and 
460 Faith and Philosophy 
pleasure on HI & 01, the fact that moral agents are biologically similar to 
nonmoral agents and moral agents experience biologically useful pain and 
pleasure should lead us to expect on HI that nonmoral agents will experience 
biologically useful pain and pleasure. But, if he's right, then the same holds 
true for theism. Barring reason not to expect nonmoral agents to experience 
biologically useful pain and pleasure on theism & 01, the fact that moral 
agents are biologically similar to nonmoral agents and moral agents experi-
ence biologically useful pain and pleasure gives us reason to expect on theism 
that nonmoral agents will experience biologically useful pain and pleasure. 
So, Draper's argument that P(02/HI & 01) > P(02/theism & 01) depends 
on our antecedently knowing something that gives us reason not to expect 
nonmoral agents to experience biologically useful pain and pleasure on theism 
& 01, and our antecedently knowing nothing that gives us comparable reason 
not to expect it on HI & 01. Why suppose theism and HI differ in this way? 
Draper claims that "there is an important difference between the biologi-
cally useful pain that 01 reports and the biologically useful pain that 02 
reports." He continues: 
Given theism & 01, we have reason to believe that God permits the pain 01 
reports because it plays some sort of (presently indiscernible) moral role in 
the lives of the humans that experience it. But the pain 02 reports cannot 
play such a role, since the subjects of it are not moral agents. This difference 
is plainly not relevant on HI & 01, but it gives us some reason on theism & 
01 to expect that the good moral reasons God has for permitting moral agents 
to experience pain do not apply to animals that are not moral agents, and 
hence some reason to believe that God will not permit such beings to expe-
rience pain. So P(02IHI & 01) is somewhat greater than P(02/theism & 01). 
(Draper 1989, p. 338) 
I take this to be the following argument: 
i. Given theism & 01, God must have morally justifying reasons to permit 
moral agents to experience biologically useful pain, reasons that have 
to do with the moral role pain plays in their lives. 
ii. But God cannot permit nonmoral agents to experience biologically use-
ful pain for these reasons since they are not moral agents. 
iii. So, we have some reason to expect that He will not permit nonmoral 
agents to experience biologically useful pain. 
iv. Hence, on theism and 01, we have some reason to expect that nonmoral 
agents would not experience biologically useful pain. 
v. But on HI and 01, we have no comparable reason to expect that non-
moral agents would not experience biologically useful pain. 
vi. Therefore, P(02IHI & 01) > P(02/theism & 01). 
The trouble here is that (iii) does not follow from (i) and (ii). Since nonmoral 
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agents cannot respond to their suffering in ways that moral agents can, then 
some reasons God might have for permitting moral agents to experience 
biologically useful pain would not justify His permitting nonmoral agents to 
experience biologically useful pain. Thus we might rightly expect that God 
would permit nonmoral agents to experience somewhat less biologically use-
ful pain than moral agents. (How much less? Who knows. Do they experience 
less? Who knows.) But to infer from (i) and (ii) that we have reason to expect 
that nonmoral agents would not experience biologically useful pain at all is 
completely unfounded. To draw that inference requires sufficient reason to 
expect that God has no other morally justifying reasons to permit biologically 
useful pain, reasons that would justify His permitting nonmoral agents to 
suffer biologically useful pain. Draper gives us no good reason to expect that; 
I doubt there is one. 
6. The Argument for P(03/HI & 01 & 02) >! 
P (03/theism & 01 & 02) 
03 expresses all the facts about both moral and nonmoral agents experiencing 
biologically gratuitous pain and pleasure. Draper gives what he calls a two-
part argument for the claim that P(03/HI & 01 & 02) >! P(03/theism & 01 
& 02) but, in fact, there are three unrelated parts which, together, he believes, 
supports his claim. I will treat each separately, although not in the order he 
presents them. 
1. The first part is this: 
[W]e have, antecedently, much more reason on HI & 01 & 02 than on theism 
& 01 & 02 to believe that the fundamental role of pain and pleasure in our 
world is a biological one and that the presence of biologically gratuitous pain 
and pleasure is epiphenomenal.... And this is undeniably supported by the 
fact that...much biologically gratuitous pain and pleasure is either pathologi-
calor biologically appropriate and very little is known to be both non-patho-
logical and biologically inappropriate. And this is exactly what one would 
expect if pain and pleasure are fundamentally biological rather than moral 
phenomena, and so is much more to be expected on HI & 01 & 02 than on 
theism & 01 & 02 (Draper, 1989, pp. 338-39). 
This is not a good argument. 
First of all, even if we grant that biologically gratuitous pain will be largely 
pathological and biologically appropriate,5 nothing we antecedently know 
gives us any reason at all to expect this to be the case on HI all by itself The 
only antecedent reason to expect this on HI & 01 & 02 is that other parts of 
organic systems have biological explanations and that 01 & 02 report that 
much of the pain and pleasure in the world is biologically useful. So, if this 
is good reason to expect on HI & 01 & 02 that biologically gratuitous pain 
and pleasure will be biologically appropriate and pathological, then, ceterus 
paribus, it is good reason to expect on theism & 01 & 02 that biologically 
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gratuitous pain and pleasure will be biologically appropriate and pathologi-
cal. Therefore, this argument of Draper's is good reason to think 03 "is much 
more to be expected on HI & 01 & 02 than on theism & 01 & 02" only if 
HI & theism themselves differ in such a way that we should antecedently 
expect biologically gratuitous pain and pleasure to be biologically appropriate 
and pathological more on HI & 01 & 02 than on theism & 01 & 02. So, 
what is the relevant difference between theism and HI? 
Draper suggests that on theism, we would antecedently expect, at bottom, 
some explanation of pain and pleasure in terms of the moral role it plays in 
the lives of sentient beings whereas on HI we would antecedently expect no 
such thing. But this is a relevant difference between HI and theism only if 
the fact that on theism pain and pleasure have a fundamentally moral expla-
nation precludes their also having a fundamentally biological explanation. I 
can think of no good reason to expect that, on theism, pain and pleasure will 
not, at bottom, be explicable both in terms of some moral purpose and in 
terms of some biological explanation. Indeed, if pain and pleasure played two 
fundamental roles in the lives of sentient beings, that would indicate effi-
ciency on the part of our designer, if it indicated anything at all. 
2. The second part of Draper's argument that P(03/HI & 01 & 02) >! P 
(03ltheism & 01 & 02) is this: 
We obviously have much more reason on theism & 01 & 02 than we have 
on HI & 01 & 02 to expect sentient beings (especially nonhuman animals) 
to be happy - in any case much more happy than they would be if their 
pleasure were limited to that reported by 01 and 02. Instead, when the facts 
03 reports are added to those reported by Oland 02, we find that many 
humans and animals experience prolonged and intense suffering and a much 
greater number are far from happy. 
What shall we make of this dense passage? 
Well, let us unpack it by first considering the biologically gratuitous pleas-
ure of the brutes. Suppose Draper is right that we have much more reason to 
think that they would experience more biologically gratuitous pleasure on 
theism & 01 & 02 than on HI & 01 & 02. Do we have any reason to believe 
the brutes don't experience the appropriate amount? What is the appropriate 
amount to expect on theism anyway? Draper implies that we should just look 
around. But having a look around isn't going to help. I, at any rate, can't tell 
how much biologically gratuitous pleasure my own cats experience nor 
whether it approaches the appropriate amount to be expected on theism. So 
how on earth am I, or anybody else, to get the information needed to take a 
guess at whether the amount of biologically gratuitous pleasure experienced 
by all the brutes we know of is up to theistic expectations? 
Consider next the biologically gratuitous pleasure of human beings. We can 
tell in a rough and ready way that many, perhaps even most, of our fellows 
PAIN AND PLEASURE 463 
do not now experience as much biologically gratuitous pleasure as they would 
like. But is this reason to infer that human beings have not experienced as 
much biologically gratuitous pleasure as is expected on theism? That all 
depends. If it did, then, given theism, we should have reason to expect that 
we would experience more biologically gratuitous pleasure in this life rather 
than later. We have no such reason. 
What about biologically gratuitous pain? Draper is certainly right that we 
and the brutes experience a lot of prolonged and intense suffering that serves 
no biological purpose. And perhaps we should not expect anything else on 
HI & 01 & 02. But why, according to Draper, should we expect much less 
biologically gratuitous pain on theism & 01 & 02? Note that it is only 
because of 0 I & 02 that we antecedently expect biologically useless pro-
longed and intense suffering on HI & 01 & 02. So, in all consistency, Draper 
should say that, ceterus paribus, for the same reason we should antecedently 
expect the same on theism & 01 & 02. Draper doesn't give use any reason 
to think the two cases are not equal in relevant respects and I can think of 
nothing plausible to fill the gap. 
3. The third part of Draper's argument for P(03/HI & 02 & 03) >! 
P (03/theism & 01 & 02) is this: 
[W]e have more reason on theism & 01 and 02 than on HI & 01 and & 02 
to expect to discover a close connection between certain moral goods (e.g., 
justice and virtue) and biologically gratuitous pain and pleasure, but we 
discover no such connection. 
I see no reason for Draper to restrict this argument to biologically gratuitous 
pain and pleasure. Moreover, most biologically gratuitous pleasure is very 
closely connected to a moral good, namely, itself. Perhaps, then, Draper's 
line of thought is better put like this: 
i. Given theism, there is good reason to expect that if there is pain, then 
there is a close connection between it and morally justifying goods. 
ii. Given HI, there is no reason at all to expect anything of comparable 
significance. 
iii. So, we have much more reason on theism than on HI to expect that if 
there is pain, then there is a close connection between it and morally 
justifying goods. 
IV. We discover no such connection. 
v. Therefore, P(painiHI) >! P(painitheism). 
What should we make of this argument? The inference from (iii) and (iv) to 
(v) is strong only if we should expect, on theism, to discover a connection 
between morally justifying goods and pain. Call this Draper s Assumption. 
Draper's Assumption, I believe, is false. 
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The first part of my reason for believing this is the Progress Argument. 
Human knowledge has progressed in a variety of fields of human enquiry, in 
both the hard and the soft sciences. The periodic discovery of previously 
unknown aspects of reality and the development of concepts with which to 
grasp them strongly suggests that there will be further progress of a similar 
sort. Since, future progress implies present ignorance, we have good reason 
to expect that there is much we are ignorant of in the sciences. Now, given 
what we have to go on in the way of archeological and paleontological data, 
it is at least as likely as not that our ancestors discovered various intrinsic 
values over a period of tens of thousands of years dotted by millenia-long 
gaps in which nothing was discovered. Hence, even if we've discovered no 
intrinsic goods for two or three thousand years, it is at least as antecedently 
likely as not that there has been the sort of periodic progress in the discovery 
of goods that strongly suggests that there remain goods to be discovered, 
hence goods we are ignorant of. In that case, we should hardly be surprised 
that, given theism, we would not discover a connection between morally 
justifying goods and pain. 
Here's another argument, the Argument from Complexity: It would not be 
surprising if God, in His perfect goodness and wisdom, would pursue the 
realization of some very great goods. Now one thing that Mozart's Violin 
Concerto No.4, Ste. Michele's Cabernet Sauvignon (Reserve) and the best 
sort of love share when compared to Chopsticks, Gallo table wine and puppy 
love is that each illustrates the fact that the value of a state of affairs is 
sometimes greater since that state of affairs is more complex. So it is at least 
as antecedently likely as not that God, in His goodness and wisdom, would 
aim to realize some very complex states of affairs. Since much of the suffering 
reported by 0 is so horrifyingly bad as to defy adequate description, it would 
take correspondingly great goods to justify its permission. In that case, it's 
at least as antecedently likely as not that God's reasons for permitting these 
horrors have to do with very complex states of affairs. Now, one of the 
well-known drawbacks of the human cognitive condition is that we are able 
to conceive of states of affairs of fairly limited complexity. Therefore, it is 
at least as antecedently likely as not that were God to have a reason to permit 
the pain and pleasure reported by 0, it would have to do with good states of 
affairs that are too complex for us to grasp given our present cognitive 
capacities. And so the Argument from Complexity gives us good reason to 
be wholly unsurprised that, on theism, we would not discover a connection 
between morally justifying goods and pain.6 . 
I submit that The Progress Argument and the Argument from Complexity 
jointly constitute sufficient reason to be in doubt about Draper's Assumption.7 
7. Conclusion 
Inspired by Hume, Draper set out to show that P(O/HI) >! P(O/theism). 
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Toward that end, he proposed to argue that P(OI/HI) >! P(Ol/theism), that 
P(02/HI & 01) > P(02/theism & 01), and that P(03/HI & 01 & 02) >! 
P(03/theism & 01 & 02). By my lights, the considerations he adduced to 
support these claims do not support his probability assignments. Indeed, it 
seems to me that a reasonable nontheist with a full understanding of Draper's 
arguments might well believe that P(O/HI) = P(O/theism), or that P(O/HI) ? 
P(O/theism). It is a pressing question whether some other considerations 
about pain and pleasure in the lives of sentient beings could be used to get 
Hume and Draper the conclusion they want in the very interesting way that 
they want it. But I shan't do their work for them here. 
Seattle Pacific University 
NOTES 
I. I am indebted to Draper for teaching me Hume's strategy. Draper 1993 is a "must 
read." 
2. An anonymous referee said that I am overlooking the notorious difficulty in speci-
fying what it is that we are to consider "apart from 0." Another said that the way I engage 
Draper is useless: "no one can usefully debate 'probabilities' of empirical states of affairs 
in this abstract way at all." It all rests on specious "intuitions about probabilites." Thus, 
although "competent" and "correct," my objections are, in a word, "trivial." One might 
add that by engaging Draper in the way I do I implicitly endorse the false assumption that 
theism is a hypothesis whose credibility is to be assessed by its ability to explain 
phenomena in the world. (See Alston 1994 on this assumption.) What can I say? Well, 
first of all, book length discussions of arguments, even important ones like Draper's, are 
not likely to be accepted by a journal, and I did want this piece to be accepted and it would 
take a book to assess these very interesting worries properly. I hope to do that in the future. 
But, in the meantime, I have limited myself to one sort or level of response. Why this one, 
rather than something more basic? Well, it is common practice to gloss over various 
assumptions of an argument in order to assess whether even the most sympathetic reading 
can withstand critical scrutiny. In doing so, I should not be taken to endorse those 
assumptions or even to take them seriously. They just aren't my topic. There are several 
reasons to proceed this way, the salient one being that many people in my audience will 
accept those assumptions and it will be of interest to them, if not others, what can be said 
against Draper's argument given those assumptions. 
3. To avoid any possible misunderstandings, note that this is not equivalent to the false 
proposition that theism entails that God has morally justifying reasons to permit pain and 
pleasure to playa biological role. God might well have no morally justifying reason to 
permit their playing that role yet be fully justified in permitting them. 
4. This point was brought to my attention by C. Stephen Layman. 
5. And I have my doubts about it. See Plantinga, 1995. 
6. Both of these arguments are inspired by William Alston. See Alston 1991, pp. 44-45, 
and Christlieb 1992. They are discussed at greater length and used against Rowe's many 
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versions of the argument from evil in Howard-Snyder 1995. See also Alston 1995 in this 
connection. 
7. In thinking about the topic of this paper, I have benefited greatly from talking with 
Frances Howard-Snyder. I thank William Alston, Paul Draper and C. Stephen Layman for 
comments on earlier drafts. 
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